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SHIFTING THE ONUS OF PROOF –
ENGLAND AND WALES – COMMON LAW
On the face of the decision of Waller J in StandardBank London Limited v Bank of Tokyo Limited [1995]CLC 496; [1996] 1 C.T.L.R. T-17, it appears that
this presumption may have already been adopted in
England and Wales. In this case, the Bank of Tokyo in Kuala
Lumpur arranged for three tested telexes to be sent to
Standard, containing a secret code confirming and
authenticating the authorised signatory of three letters of
credit with a total face value of US$19.8m, and confirming
that the Bank of Tokyo accepted all responsibilities and
liabilities under those letters of credit. Evidence was
adduced to indicate that banks not only used this system
with confidence, but used it to avoid arguments about
authority. In this instance, the tested telexes were sent
fraudulently.
The main thrust of the Bank of Tokyo’s case was this:
because they could establish that a fraudster must have
been working in their tested telex department, Standard
could only rely upon the apparent authority of the tested
telexes. As a result, it argued that there was a lower test to
establish the lack of apparent authority. Waller J disagreed
with this argument, because the issue was not reliance on
apparent authority, as set out at 502 C:
“Standard rely first on a general representation by BOT that
if a telex comes by tested telex that telex will be duly
authorised by BOT (that representation on any view is
authorised);
second they rely on the use of the tested telex mechanism itself
as representing that the telex is authorised as the previous
representation stated that it would be; and
thirdly they rely on the statement in the telex as being the
authorised statement of BOT.”
The Bank of Tokyo was found liable for negligent
misrepresentation because the tested telexes could not
have been sent without negligence on the bank’s part.
Whether Standard had a duty to inquire into the
authenticity of the tested telexes depended, in Waller J’s
view at 501 H, on the circumstances of each and every
case.
Tested telexes contain codes or tests which are secret
between the sender and the recipient. This allows the
recipient to accept without question that the telex was sent
by and with the authority of the sender. The tested telexes
in this instance were sent through other banks, because the
Bank of Tokyo in Kuala Lumpur did not have a means of
directly authenticating telexes between itself and Standard.
By sending tested telexes, banks intend the receiving
bank to act on the content without further instructions.
This means the receiving bank requires the sending bank
to:
• confirm the person signing the document is an
authorised signatory,
• verify the signatory is authorised to sign the particular
document,
• provide sufficient evidence to satisfy the recipient that
the sending bank authorised the sending of the telex. 3
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Both the government and the industry are keenly promoting the
use of electronic signatures. It is assumed that the widespread
use of electronic signatures will encourage greater use of the
internet as a means to buy goods and services. This two part
article looks at the evidential issues relating to electronic
signatures, and illustrates the weakness of the infrastructure,
which in turn highlights the risks that both users and recipients
encounter when using electronic signatures.
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Superficially, there is a similarity between the
circumstances of this case and the world of public key
infrastructure, where the authentication process has to go
through so many channels. However, there is a distinction
between a tested telex produced in a bank and the public
key infrastructure. The authority of a telex is reliant upon
internal systems within the bank. No third party is involved
in identifying the sender of the telex or authenticating the
codes or text sent. In addition, the tested telex is sent
through other banks over secure lines of communication.
Conversely, the public key infrastructure operates over
the internet, which was designed to be open and is,
therefore, insecure. The link between the identity and
authentication of a user of an electronic signature is not as
cohesive as between such trusted parties as banks. There
are significantly more links, which neither party has control
over, in the chain between the user of an electronic
signature and the party intending to rely on an electronic
signature.
As a result, it can be argued that there is a distinction
between what can be termed a “secure communication
system” and an “open communications system”. Clearly
the burden of proving that an electronic signature was used
without authority must be borne by either the user or the
relying party. In this instance, Waller J took the view that
the sender was in full control of the environment in which
the tested telex was sent, and decided that the burden
should fall on the sender.
Whether it is for the user, when using an electronic
signature, to bear such a burden, is debatable. For instance,
the type of technology used, both its purpose and
methodology, may have a bearing on this issue. There are
several factors that must be considered before reaching a
conclusion in relation to this matter. First, if it is accepted
that the relying party is required to establish whether they
could rely on the certificate in all the circumstances, they
will be required to provide any or all of the following
evidence, depending on the nature of the challenge:
• the certifying certificate used to affix the electronic
signature was used properly,
• the certifying certificate used to affix the electronic
signature to the communication had not been revoked
or compromised in some way, by providing the
statement under the provisions of section 7(3) to prove
the integrity and reliability of the relevant certifying
certificate,
• that the communication could not have come from
another source, or
• that the communication was intended to have legal
effect, because extrinsic evidence can be produced to
demonstrate the intention of the sender.
Providing the replying party has carried out all the
relevant checks required, it can then be argued that it has
discharged what can be described as a procedural and due
diligence burden.
Once the relying party has satisfied a judge that it has
discharged the procedural and due diligence burden, the
user will need to address the issue of the security and
integrity of their computer or system. This can be
described as the burden of proof of security and integrity,
which comprises both a persuasive burden (or burden of
proof on the pleadings) and the evidential burden of
adducing evidence.
In the event of a dispute, it follows that it is the holder
of the certifying certificate who is in the best position to
prove either that the security in place was inadequate,
which implies it would be possible for an unauthorised
third party (internal or external) to use the certifying
certificate improperly, or that the security in place was such
that the certifying certificate could not be used improperly.
The user will be in control of the following (this list is not
exhaustive):
• the hardware and the software of the computer or
system upon which the private key sits,
• the security in place in relation to the computer or
system, the use of the system by employees and the
control of any tokens used to store the private key,
• the ability of the user to revoke their key promptly after
finding out that their system or key was compromised.
If the user wishes to argue their security was so poor that
an unauthorised third party could have gained access to the
system to send an electronic communication with an
electronic signature attached without authority, the user
will undoubtedly be admitting breach of contract with the
vendor from whom they obtained the certifying certificate.
The user may also be admitting they were negligent.
Finally, once a communication leaves the user’s
computer or system, they relinquish control of the
document. If the user can demonstrate the effectiveness of
the security and integrity of their computer or system, the
next link is the network over which the communication
passes. In this instance, evidence may be required from a
number of organisations in the chain (discussed in more
detail below), including:
• the methods of management the trusted third party
uses to control its infrastructure,
• whether the link between the issuing of the certificate
and its use was to be trusted, and
• the effectiveness or otherwise of any third party
supplier whose product or service is included in the
chain.
If the relying party can demonstrate that they carried out
due diligence, and the user can demonstrate the security
and integrity of their computer or system, the question
then becomes: which party to the proceedings has the4
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persuasive and evidential burden of demonstrating any
weaknesses in the infrastructure. Whichever party bears
this burden, it will be an expensive process, bearing in
mind the number of organisations that make up the chain.
In a dispute, the burden of proof will inevitably be on the
party that asserts the problem lies with third parties in the
chain. It seems that all the relying party needs to do is to
demonstrate procedural and due diligence. Thereafter, it is
for the sender to either demonstrate lack of security, or the
fault occurred as the result of failure by third parties in the
chain, unlike in the burden in proving a manuscript
signature. This will inevitably mean that the sender will
have to make this assertion in the pleadings, which will
determine the persuasive burden (and invariably the
evidential burden) will lie with the sending party.
SHIFTING THE ONUS OF PROOF –
ENGLAND AND WALES – ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS ACT 2000
By section 8(1) of the Act, Parliament has given the
appropriate Minister the authority to modify the provisions
of:
(a) any enactment or subordinate legislation, or
(b) any scheme, licence, authorisation or approval issued,
granted or given by or under any enactment or
subordinate legislation
in such manner as he may think fit for the purpose of
authorising or facilitating the use of electronic
communications or electronic storage (instead of other
forms of communication or storage) for any purpose
mentioned in subsection (2).
Whilst the power to modify legislation may be
considered to be helpful in changing the law relating to the
use of electronic signatures, nevertheless it must be
pointed out that the Act allows for the burden of proof to
be shifted, if so desired by a minister. The relevant sections
are section 8(4)(g), which reads as follows:
(4) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1),
the power to make an order under this section shall
include power to make an order containing any of the
following provisions –
…
(g) provision, in relation to cases in which the use of
electronic communications or electronic storage is
so authorised, for the determination of any of the
matters mentioned in subsection (5), or as to the
manner in which they may be proved in legal
proceedings;
and section 8(5)(d), which reads as follows:
(5) The matters referred to in subsection (4)(g) are –
…
(d) the person by whom such a thing was done
In combination, these section gives scope to a Minister
to determine where the burden of proof will lie in any
particular order issued under the Act.
As a result, persons deciding to use electronic signatures
will need to ensure they guard the use of their certifying
certificates very closely. In particular, they will need to
ensure that their computer or the system upon which the
electronic signature sits, is properly protected from the
risks set out later in this article. People using electronic
signatures will have to determine what steps are reasonable
to protect their private keys. In all probability, companies
and firms will have to consider abiding by DISC PD
5000:1999 Electronic documents and e-commerce
transactions as legally admissible evidence. In this respect,
it is only right that solicitors should be concerned about
the proposals for conveyancing, because the risks are
serious and certainly outweigh the benefits that some
people claim.
EVIDENTIAL WEIGHT
It will evident from the above discussion that trusted
third parties will need to guarantee that they can audit the
evidential trail in relation to the use and control of the
certifying certificates and key numbers they issue. In this
respect, both the trusted third parties offering certifying
certificates and individuals challenging the admissibility of
communications associated with electronic signatures will
need to be able to demonstrate the integrity of their
respective systems (or lack of integrity), as the case may be.
The evidential weight to be given to evidence relating to
electronic signatures is predicated on the degree of control
exercised over the controlled and secure environment of all
the parties in the chain. It follows that it will be for a judge
to decide what weight, if any, is to be placed on the
integrity of the infrastructure in the event of a dispute.
THE TRUSTED THIRD PARTY
The use of a certifying certificate does not necessarily
require the existence of a certification authority. Parties
that wish to agree a procedure that ensures the authenticity
of documents passing between them can make their own
arrangements. They may choose to use a private key, where
each party has the same key, and do not share it with any
other entity. Alternatively, they may rely on a dual key,
comprising a private key and a public key, issued by a
certification authority or trusted third party.
When a certification authority issues a certificate, it
bases the issuance of the certificate on its Certificate
Practice Statement and terms of trade. A contractual
relationship is formed between the certification authority
and the customer who buys the certificate. Whilst the
certificate purports to verify the identity of an individual
person or legal entity, it is the merchant or person receiving
the certificate that relies on the content of the certificate,
known as the relying party. The logic is as follows: 5
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• The individual provides the certification authority with
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that they are who
they say they are. Depending on the level of the
certificate obtained, this information could be merely
name, address and the number of a driving licence. For
certificates that will support high value transactions, the
person seeking a certificate may be required to provide
more robust evidence, including physically appearing
before a notary public.
• The certification authority provides the user with a
certificate.
• The individual is then given a keyholder’s name.
• The keyholder is the person that obtained the
certificate.
• This all the recipient needs to know.
There are a number of flaws with this logic. For instance,
John Smith of York may wish to enter a contract with a
company who is not aware of his identity. The company
cannot distinguish, when it looks at the certificate, how
many John Smiths live in York and whether this particular
John Smith is the person identified with the certificate.
Unless the certificate provides the company with a unique
identifier identifying this particular John Smith (which they
may or may not provide), and the company wishes to
confirm John Smith’s identity, it must consider other ways
of doing so. In conclusion, a certification authority
provides a very narrow promise when issuing a certifying
certificate. It does not appear that certification authorities
seek first to establish the identity of a person and then go
on to verify that identity. It is crucial to understand that
verification is not the same as identification.
The point is, the certification authority generally does
not share a secret with the person to whom they provide a
certificate. Many certification authorities use the
information collected by a credit bureau to identify the
identity of the applicant. This means the identification
process is based on the accuracy of the data collected by
the credit bureau and the effectiveness of the credit bureau
in keeping the information up-to-date. Another issue is
whether the recipient of the electronic signature trusts the
originator’s certification authority.
THE ROLE OF THE TRUSTED THIRD PARTY
The certification authority is a trusted third party that
purports to ascertain the identity of a person, and certifies
that the public key of a private key pair used to create a
certifying certificate actually belongs to a particular person
or entity. The steps in the certification process will depend
on what evidence the certification authority obtains from
the person wishing to buy a certifying certificate, and the
value attached to the certificate. The reader will be aware
that Article 5 of the EU Directive 1999/93/EC on a
Community framework for electronic signatures, OJ L13
19 January 2000 provides for both simple electronic
signatures and certified advanced electronic signatures. It is
debatable whether the UK government will have to amend
the Act to provide for an advanced electronic signature, but
the existence of an advanced electronic signature does not
affect the technical problems that may arise where a person
does not accept they used their electronic certificate to sign
a communication.
For instance, an individual could generate their own
public and private key pair, using software on their
computer. The individual then provides the certification
authority with evidence of their identity. The type of
evidence and degree of proof will depend on the nature of
the type of certifying certificate required. In outline, it has
been suggested that a certification authority will undertake
the following tasks:
• reliably identify the person or entity applying for a
certifying certificate
• reliably verify their legal capacity
• confirm the attribution of a certifying certificate to an
identified physical person or legal entity by means of a
certifying certificate
• maintain online access to the public register
• take measures to ensure the confidentiality of the
private key is guaranteed.
When the certification authority has verified the identity
of the individual or entity to their satisfaction, they will
issue a certificate. This is a computer record that affirms
the connection of a public key to an identified person or
corporate entity. The certificate can identify the following:
• the certification authority issuing the certificate
• the individual’s public key, and
• other information including, but not limited to the
serial number of the certificate, the user’s name, place
of birth, whether they are a natural person, their legal
domicile, virtual domicile, an expiry date for the public
key and, depending on the type of certificate issued, the
value limit and any powers of agency.
THE INFRASTRUCTURE
To enable a user of a certifying certificate to trust a
certification authority, a number of factors have to be taken
into account, some of which will be determined by
legislation, others which are internal to the certificate
authority.
Internal management
The internal management of a certification authority,
which the individual user will not be familiar with, can
affect the trust to be placed in the certificates issued. For
instance, the level and extent of the checks made on
employees may be relevant together with whether the
internal management of the certificate system is properly6
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carried out. The level and extent of any insurance cover
may also have a bearing on the suitability of different types
of certificate issued.
Public degree of trust
Factors that will affect the degree of trust in a
certification authority that should be public knowledge,
include the level of certificate issued and the limitation of
liability for that particular certificate. The verification
process is an important function that should be undertaken
in public. The certification authority should be in a
position to verify the integrity of the public key and validate
the encoding techniques. Further, it should be possible for
a person who wishes to rely on a public key issued by a
certification authority to check that the certificate is valid
by way of the certification revocation lists. Whether a
certificate has been revoked is an important part of the
trust placed in a certification authority.
An additional factor to be taken into account is the
certification authorities often, it appears, sub-contract the
work of issuing individual certifying certificates. Thus a
user may receive a certificate from a certification authority
which has been signed by the intermediate authority. The
problem is compounded if the software of the relying party
cannot check the intermediate certificate. If the relying
party cannot check the full chain of certificates, the value
to be attached to the individual certifying certificate is
diminished significantly.
It should be noted that the United Kingdom
government has provided relevant legislative provisions
relating to certification authorities in the Act. The
government intend that a voluntary scheme be introduced
to regulate the industry, called the tScheme.
Revocation of certificate
Some certification authorities support certification
revocation lists. This allows a person or business to check
the revocation list to determine whether a certificate has
been revoked or has expired. There may be many reasons
for revoking a certificate, including:
• the private keys corresponding to the certificate have
been lost or compromised,
• the certificate holder asks for the certificate to be
revoked,
• the certification authority may revoke a certificate
where the holder breaches a term of the agreement, or
• if the certificate was issued in error.
Where such a list exists, an important question is
whether the certification authority keeps this list up-to-
date and whether, therefore, it can be relied upon to
provide a definitive answer that can be trusted. If a
certification authority does not have a revocation list, the
person seeking to determine whether to rely on a
certificate needs to know how they can establish whether a
key has been revoked or compromised.
Expiry of keys
Certification authorities provide for the expiry of keys.
One technical question relates to how the life of the key is
computed. Ellison and Schneier contend that the key has a
“theft lifetime” as a function of the vulnerability of the
sub-system that stores the key. Other factors that also
should be taken into account include the threat of physical
and network exposure to attacks and how attractive the key
is to an attacker.
Root hierarchy
One of the models used to establish the validity of a
certification authority is to have a hierarchy of authorities,
each authority certifying the technologies and practices of
the subordinate authorities. Thus there could be a top level
authority, followed by one or more subordinate authorities,
each verifying the certificates of the authority below it in
the hierarchy.
FAILURE OF SECURITY
The extent of the security measures in place, either on
the computer or the system upon which the certifying
certificate is located, is an important factor in evaluating
the possibility that a system can be compromised. Clearly
there is a balance to be struck between the cost of a
certificate and the liability accepted by the issuing
authority, although this matter is not discussed in this
paper. Below are some of the potential areas for concern:
Hacking into the system that supports the certifying
certificate
A hacker can obtain access to the user’s system and use
the private key of the user. If a hacker is successful, the user
may either not have taken sufficient steps to ensure they
had adequate security in place to prevent such an attack, or
they may have failed to properly implement the security
measures that were in place to prevent such an attack.
Examples of simple security measures that can be easily
attacked include the use of a password to enter the
computer (the password may be easy to guess) or, if the key
number is stored on a smart card, how resistant the card is
to attack.
Side-channel attacks
A hacker can, by carefully measuring the amount of time
it takes the system to perform the operations of a private
key, obtain the fixed Diffie-Hellman exponents, factor RSA
keys and break other cryptographic systems. Such an attack
is possible because other variables relating to the
performance of the hardware and software can be
monitored by the hacker to exploit measurements in
timing to find the entire key. Such an attack is 7
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computationally inexpensive against a vulnerable system. A
hacker can also exploit the variation in voltage consumed in
order to derive information about the private key number.
For instance, some computational processes run so slowly
that it is possible to see the mathematical functions
performed by the software. Smart cards are also vulnerable
to this type of attack. The card is plugged into a reader or
encoder and the information contained on the memory is
protected by secondary protection. Where the reader or
encoder is powered by a battery which is running low in
power, it is possible to obtain access to the memory by by-
passing the security mechanism on the card.
Breaking into the user’s computer: forgery and
identity theft
A hacker can break into a user’s computer and take over
the system. By undertaking this activity, the hacker can use
the private key of the holder. This is an example of forgery
or identity theft: a legitimate certifying certificate is used
that purports to come from the user, but which is actually
not authorised by the legitimate user.
Misuse of computer power
It is also possible for a computer to be controlled to a
degree that the holder is, unwittingly, contributing
computer power as part of a collective effort to crack keys.
The fraudulent substitution of a public key for that
of a genuine user
This is where an impostor substitutes their own public
key for that of the genuine user. There is no attempt to
recreate the certifying certificate of the genuine user. The
attacker can sign a document with a false public key that
identifies the genuine user incorrectly.
Theft of keys
Employees or directors may use their position of power
and influence in collusion with others to steal keys or
encryption secrets.
FAILURE OF THE VERIFICATION SYSTEM
Subverting the “root” key
Certification authorities use root public keys. Thus, if an
attacker can add their own public key to the root key list,
the attacker can issue its own certificates. These certificates
will be treated exactly like legitimate certificates.
Obtaining access to the certification authorities
private key
Where an attacker discovers the certification authorities
private key, they can produce an unlimited number of
ostensibly valid, but forged certificates.
Certification authority erroneously issuing
certificates to somebody claiming to be other than
they are
For the public key infrastructure to be trusted, a
certification authority must ensure that the architecture
and systems that support and issue certificates cannot be
abused by somebody obtaining a certificate in the name of
another person or entity. Unfortunately for VeriSign, a
company that issues certifying certificates, this actually
occurred in January 2001. VeriSign issued two Class 3
code-signing certificates incorrectly to a person falsely
claiming to represent Microsoft. The certificates were
issued to “Microsoft Corporation”. During a routine audit
in mid-March, the error was discovered and VeriSign
notified Microsoft of the error, posted a public notice and
revoked the certificates on its certificate revocation list.
This matter did not end with the posting of the public
notice on the certificate revocation list, however, as
pointed out by Gregory L Guerin in his article “Microsoft,
VeriSign, and Certification Revocation”, at
http://amug.org/~glguerin/opinion/revocation.html. The
person wishing to obtain access to the certificate
revocation list must have the correct uniform resource
locator (URL). The URL is the address from which the
certificate revocation list can be downloaded. There are
two technical issues that affect the ability to download a
suitably-recent certificate revocation list:
• how the certification authority tells you where to obtain
the relevant certificate revocation list, and
• whether your computer carries out the functions you
require.
Guerin points out that there are many different ways to
obtain a certificate revocation list, and because there is no
standard within the industry, no one method is mandatory.
Regardless of the method used, the key evidential issues for
anybody relying on a certifying certificate are as follows:
• The certificate revocation list should be digitally signed
by the certificate authority using its root certificate to
prevent a certificate revocation list from being forged.
• The certificate revocation list is dated by the
certification authority, which means that every
certificate revocation list expires.
• Every certificate revocation list has a higher sequence
than the one issued previously, to prevent forgery.
• The person wishing to check a particular certifying
certificate must know where to find a suitably-recent
certificate revocation list.
• The certificate revocation list must actually be obtained.
• The contents of the certificate revocation list must be
authenticated.
• The person relying on a certifying certificate must
actually use the certificate revocation list.8
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In the VeriSign case, the certificate revocation list was
available from a URL that was well known to developers of
security products, and the certificate revocation list can be
downloaded with any browser. In this instance, as Guerin
points out, VeriSign put the responsibility on the developer
of the software to either ensure the software could retrieve
the certificate revocation list, or provide a means to the
user of the software to install the VeriSign certificate
revocation list after it had been manually downloaded by
the user of the computer.
According to Guerin, Microsoft designed the software to
take a user to the address where the certificate revocation
list existed only if the address was provided by VeriSign
with the certifying certificate. Apparently, VeriSign does not
issue Class 3 code-signing certificates with an address for
the certificate revocation list. This appears to mean that the
user of the relevant Microsoft software cannot retrieve the
certificate revocation list of a given certifying certificate
issued by VeriSign. At the time of this incident, Guerin
reached the conclusion that Microsoft did not have
software that had a working revocation infrastructure.
If it is the case that a vendor of software such as
Microsoft did not have a working revocation infrastructure
in place in the past, then it could be argued that past
certifying certificates can hardly be said to be reliable. As a
result, the evidential weight to be given to a certifying
certificate must be considered against these practical
problems, otherwise the evidence may be so poor as to
make the concept of a certifying certificate irrelevant.
THIRD PARTY SUPPLIERS IN THE CHAIN
As the example above illustrates, there may be a number
of weaknesses in the security chain that will affect the
reliability of the certifying certificate, including the
hardware, software, internet connectivity and time
stamping functions – all of which are not within the
control of the user or of trusted third parties. In addition,
the concept of authentication vendors, or cyber notaries,
all adds to the complexity of the infrastructure.
TECHNICAL ISSUES
The technical issues relating to certifying certificates are
complex. The Internet Law and Policy Forum have
identified a number of problems that will affect cross-
border use of certifying certificates. They include the lack
of detailed technical standards, whether certification
authorities should be accredited, certified or registered,
the legal effects of such certificates, whether to have
supervisory bodies and whether the standards adopted by
various countries are international in nature. The
conclusion is that the various initiatives implemented to
date will not allow certifying certificate technologies to be
standardised. The reader will readily note that the
evidential weight to be attached to an electronic signature
will be affected by these issues.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Over the past few years politicians have rushed into
passing laws that attempt to place electronic signatures on
par with manuscript signatures. In putting legislation on to
the statute book, individual states have:
• failed to agree an international meaning of what is
meant by an “electronic signature”,
• taken different views in relation to the types of
electronic signature to be made available (ordinary
signatures and qualified signatures),
• ignored the issues relating to compatibility of software
and hardware, and
• failed to agree whether trusted third parties should be
licensed or unlicensed, public or private.
The Electronic Communications Act 2000 provides for the
statutory basis of the admissibility of electronic signatures.
The admissibility of the public key as a component of an
electronic signature may appear to be straightforward.
However, in the event of a dispute where one party relies
on the electronic signature of another and the owning party
denies affixing their electronic signature to the
communication in question (which also implies they deny
they sent the content of the communication as well), then
it will be for a judge to examine the evidence to determine
whether it can be shown that the electronic signature in
question was actually used by the owning party.
In such circumstances, the question of what, if any, legal
presumptions operate, will need to be addressed in relation
to the technical issues set out above. Contrary to the
presumption that machines (i.e. the computer or system
upon which the electronic signature sits) may be presumed
to be in working order, it is suggested that there can be no
single presumption, because an electronic signature is not
reliant upon a single machine. Various factors must be
taken into account, such as:
• the nature of the hardware and the software of the actual
computer or system upon which the private key sat,
• the security in place on that computer or system,
• the methods of management used by the trusted third
party and the holder of the electronic signature, and
• whether the link between the issuing of the certificate
and its use was to be trusted.
Other issues will need to be canvassed, including the
effectiveness of any third party supplier whose product or
service is included in the chain. Further issues have also
been identified by the American Bar Association:
• whether the holder of the certifying certificate carried
out their contractual duty of care to avoid the private
key being compromised
• whether the replying party could rely on the certificate
in all the circumstances 9
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The media treat children generally as either youngvillains or victims, and as if young offenders fallexclusively into the former category. However those
who deal with them professionally know that children with
unmet welfare needs and children who commit crime are
not disparate populations. The two categories certainly
overlap, and the latter category is pretty much a sub-set of
the former, which is defined by section 17 (10) of the
Children Act 1989 in respect of a child who:
“ …. is unlikely to achieve or maintain, or have the
opportunity of achieving or maintaining, a reasonable
standard of health or development without the provision … of
services by a local authority … his health and development is
likely to be significantly impaired without the provision of
such services … [or] …. he is disabled, ..”.
Disability includes being blind, deaf, dumb or suffering
from mental disorder of any kind. Development includes
physical, intellectual, emotional, social or behavioural
development, and health means physical or mental health.
(The relevance of these definitions I shall refer to in greater
detail in due course).
My starting point, however, is a quotation from the
Roman poet Juvenal which was used by Lord Hewart, the
Lord Chief Justice in 1931 when delivering the second
Clarke Hall lecture on young offenders – or as he called
A
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• if the holder of the certifying certificate revoked their
key promptly upon finding out their system or key was
compromised
• which of the two innocent parties (relying party and
holder) was in the better position to protect themselves
from damage at the hands of an impostor.
Whether electronic signatures will ever be used widely is
a matter that only the passing of time will determine. The
main issue surrounding electronic signatures relates to the
ease by which a signature can be misused. This article seeks
to show that there are many ways in which the use of an
electronic signature can be challenged, although it is
doubtful that there will be large numbers of disputes which
focus on the sole issue of whether an electronic
communication was signed by an unauthorised electronic
signature.
10
Amicus Curiae Issue 46 March/April 2003
© Stephen Mason, 2002
Stephen Mason is a barrister and Chairman of Pario Communications
Limited. He specialises in e-risks, e-business, data protection and
interception of communications.
stephenmason@pariocommunications.co.uk
This paper was written to accompany a lecture given to a joint
meeting of the Society for Advanced Legal Studies and British
Computer Society Internet Specialist Group on 15 November
2001 in Senate Room, Senate House, University of London,
chaired by David Spinks, Director Information Assurance, EDS.
This paper was first published in two parts in The Computer Law and
Security Report, Part I May/June 2002, Volume 18, Issue 3, 175 –
180, Part II July/August, Volume 18, Issue 4, 241 – 248.
Readers may download a copy of this paper from the web site,
which contains the full references.
The law as Janus:
children, crime and care
by Peter Harris
My inspiration for the choice of the subject of this article is the Michael Sieff
Foundation conference which took place in September 2001 on “The
Needs of Offending Children”. The focus of that conference was the
forensic dichotomy that is represented by the Civil and Criminal Justice
Systems when the State intervenes in the lives of children in respect of
events which require a judicial decision. This lead naturally to the title I have
given to this article since the Roman god Janus is always depicted as a head
with two faces looking in opposite directions.
